FourWinds10.com - Delivering Truth Around the World
Custom Search

COURT RULES SUPERCEDE THE CONSTITUTION

Luis Ewing

Smaller Font Larger Font RSS 2.0

“In the beginning of a change, the Patriot is a scarce man – brave – hated – scorned.  When his cause succeeds,  however, the timid join him, for then it costs nothing to be a Patriot.” Mark Twain

“One man with courage is a majority.”  Thomas Jefferson

“One man with God is the majority.”  Luis Ewing

“One man with the law is the majority.”  Luis Ewing

SUBJECT:    THE JUDGES HAVE CREATED A LITERAL . . . “ALICE IN WONDERLAND FANTASY” . . .  WHERE THEY THINK THAT THE  LAWS ARE THE WORDS THAT COME OUT OF THEIR MOUTHS . . . AND THEY MAKE IT UP AS THEY GO ALONG . . . AND . . . LEGISLATE FROM THE BENCH . . .  AND THIS IS PROVED BY THE FACT THAT . . . “THE COURT RULES SUPERCEDE THE STATUTES” . . . WHICH ARE NOT THE LAW IN EVERY FEDERAL DISTRICT STATE!!!!

“I was about to say that I'd hate to live in a country where the law could mean whatever its rulers said it meant, when it occurred to me that I already do. -- Joseph Sobran

“Ye are of your father the devil, and the lusts of your father ye will do: he hath been a murderer from the beginning, and abode not in the truth, because there is no truth in him.  When he speaketh a lie, then speaketh of he of his own: for he is a liar, and the father thereof.”  John 8:44

“If the time shall ever come (which Heaven avert), when men shall be placed in the supreme tribunal of the country, who entertain opinions hostile to the just powers of the Constitution, we shall then be visited by an evil defying all remedy. Our case will be past surgery. From that moment the Constitution is at an end. . . . If I live to see that day come, I shall despair of the country. . . . I know of no security against the possibility of this evil, but an awakened public vigilance. I know of no safety, but in that state of public opinion which shall lead it to rebuke and put down every attempt . . . to dilute the Constitution by creating a court which shall construe away its provisions. . . . Let us hope that we shall never see the time when . . . the government shall be found in opposition to the Constitution, and when the guardians of Union shall become its betrayers.   --Daniel Webster, Excerpts from a speech delivered at a public dinner in New York on March 10, 1831.

We are fast approaching the stage of the ultimate inversion: the stage where the government is free to do anything it pleases, while the citizen may act only by permission; which is the stage of the darkest periods of human history, the stage of rule by brute force.   –  Ayn Rand.

“And I saw seats: and they sat upon them, and judgment was given unto them, and I saw the souls of them that were beheaded for the witness of jesus, and for the word of god, and which did not worship the beast, neither his image, neither had taken his mark upon their foreheads or on their hands: and they lived, and reigned with Christ a thousands years.”  Revelations, 20:4.

“We will have a world government whether you like it or not. The only question is whether that government will be achieved by conquest or consent." –  Jewish Banker Paul Warburg

The Revised Code of Washington is not the law.”  Parosa v. Tacoma, 57 Wn.(2d) 409  (Dec.22, 1960).

CHARLESTON HESTON  IN HIS ROLE AS MOSES IN THE MOVIE CALLED . . . “THE TEN COMMANDMENTS” . . . SAID . . . “SHALL WE BE UNDER THE RULE OF LAW” . . .  OR . . .  “SHALL WE BE UNDER THE RULE OF MEN.”

I am  . . . the . . .  “RCW CODE BUSTER” . . .  first and foremost to show ALL MY CHRISTIAN BROTHERS that . . . [mans law] [the RCW] (sic) . . . is . . . NOT THE LAW!!!!

“And putting out the handwriting of ordinances that was against us, which was contrary to us, he even took it out of the way, and fastened it upon the cross, . . .”  Colossians 2: 14

Here is the CrR 1.1 decisional law of the TERRITORY OF WASHINGTON . . . that clearly . . . ALL NINE MEN . . . of . . . THE WASHINGTON STATE SUPREME COURT . . . clearly held that . . . THE RCW STATUTES THAT THE COPS CITE YOU WITH FOR SPEEDING, DUI, RUNNING A RED LIGHT, ETC., . . . ARE NOT THE LAW!!!!

AND NOW I CAN SHOW YOU HOW THOSE WHO CALL THEMSELVES THE JEW BUT WHO ARE NOT THE JEW, BUT LIE . . . (JOHN 8:44) . . . AND ARE FROM THE SYNAGOGUE OF SATAN AS IS STATED IN . . . REVELATIONS 2;9 . . . REVELATIONS 3:9 . . . AND . . . REVELATIONS 20:4 . . . SET ASIDE . . . THE PUBLIC LAW . . . AND REPLACED IT WITH . . .  PRIVATE COPYRIGHTED LAW . . . WHICH ARE CALLED . . . THE REVISED CODES . . . IN ALL 50 PLUS CORPORATE STATES!!!!

“But the legislature specifically disclaimed any intention to change the meaning of any statute.  The compilers of the code were not empowered by congress to amend existing law, and doubtless had no thought of doing so ...”   ...the act before us does not purport to amend a section of an act, but only a section of a compilation entitled “REVISED CODE OF WASHINGTON,” WHICH IS NOT THE LAW.  Such an act purporting to amend only a section of the prima facie compilation leaves the law unchanged. En Banc.”  PAROSA v. TACOMA, 57 Wn.(2d) 409  (Dec.22, 1960).

The criminally corrupt jew attorneys in all 50 states have created a literal . . . “Alice in Wonderland Fantasy” . . .  WHERE THE LAWS ARE THE WORDS THAT COME OUT OF THEIR MOUTHS . . . and they make it up as they go along and legislate from the bench . . . and this is proved by the fact that . . .  THE COURT RULES SUPERCEDE THE STATUTES . . . in every federal . . . DISTRICT STATE.

“Am I therefore become your enemy, because I tell you the truth?”  Galations 4:16

"There's freedom of speech, until you say something Zionists don't like

to hear"  Helen Thomas

YES, THE COURT RULES SUPERCEDE ALL THE STATUTES!!!!

DID YOU KNOW THAT THE U.S. CONSTITUTION IS JUST . . . A MERE STATUTE????

Don’t believe it????

Please go to your local library and ask the law librarian how to look up the U.S. Constitution in your STATE statute books and ask her to show you the U.S. Constitution!

Then go to the very end of the Constitution and read the footnotes and there you will see the above listed federal statute, that was . . . enacted February 21st, 1871, Section 34 of the Journals of the Acts of the 41st Congress, section III, chapter 61 & 62 An Act to provide a Government for the District of Columbia 16 Stat section 419 of the Statutes at Large which in fact and law is really the 1871 District of Columbia Constitution!

YES, THAT’S RIGHT,  WHAT YOU CURRENTLY THINK IS THE U.S. CONSTITUTION IS REALLY THE 1871 DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CONSTITUTION THAT WAS . . . Enacted February 21st, 1871, Section 34 of the Journals of the Acts of the 41st Congress, section III, chapter 61 & 62 An Act to provide a Government for the District of Columbia 16 Stat section 419 . . . of the Statutes at Large . . . which is really the 1871 District of Columbia Constitution for the [c]itizens of the District of Columbia . . . and the residents and inhabitants of  . . .  THE TERRITORIES . . . and . . . THE POSSESSIONS!!!!

YES, THE SO CALLED U.S. CONSTITUTION IS A JUST MERE STATUTE!!!!

The U.S. Supreme Court has stated something similar to Parosa v. Tacoma, supra, just below here:

        “Nor must speech be censored to the tastes of government or risk sedition charges.  If the exercise of a constitutional right can become the cause for imprisonment, the constitution has been nullified and there is no security from omnipotent government; the constitution has become a worthless scrap of paper.”  Marchetti v US, 390 US 39, 57.

DO YOU WANT TO LEARN HOW TO REALLY CLAIM ORIGINAL JURISDICTION UNDER THE ORIGINAL CONSTITUTIONS????

    “But in considering the question before us, it must be borne in mind that there is no law of nations standing between the people of the United States and their Government, and interfering with their relation to each other .  The powers of the Government, and the rights of the citizens under it, are positive and practical regulations plainly written down.  The people of the United States have delegated to it certain enumerated powers, and forbidden it to exercise others.” Dred Scott v. Sanford, 19 How (60 U.S.) 393, 452, 15 L.Ed. 691 (A.D. 1856-1857).

DID YOU KNOW THAT THE FRAUDULENT VOLUME 0 WASHINGTON STATE CONSTITUTION IS A MERE STATUTE CONTAINED IN THE RCW’s????

RCW 9A.04.110 (24) DEFINES THE CONSTITUTION AS A STATUTE!

        “RCW 9A.04.110 Definitions.

        (24) “Statute means the Constitution or an act of the legislature or initiative or referendum of this state.”  And;

YES, I KNOW THAT ALL NINE MEN OF THE WASHINGTON STATE SUPREME COURT HAVE SPECIFICALLY HELD AND RULED THAT . . . “THE REVISED CODE OF WASHINGTON” . . .  IS . . . “NOT THE LAW.”

See Parosa v. Tacoma, which clearly reads:

 “But the legislature specifically disclaimed any intention to change the meaning of any statute.  The compilers of the code were not empowered by congress to amend existing law, and doubtless had no thought of doing so ...”   ...the act before us does not purport to amend a section of an act, but only a section of a compilation entitled “REVISED CODE OF WASHINGTON,” WHICH IS NOT THE LAW.  Such an act purporting to amend only a section of the prima facie compilation leaves the law unchanged. En Banc.”  PAROSA v. TACOMA, 57 Wn.(2d) 409  (Dec.22, 1960).

Yes,  you got it,  if the RCW state statutes are NOT the law,  then the Washington State Constitution is NOT the law pursuant to Parosa v. Tacoma, supra.

THERE IS SIMILAR CASE LAW IN ALL 50 PLUS . . . FEDERAL DISTRICT STATES!!!!

I CAN SHOW EVERYONE THAT THE STATUTES ARE NOT THE LAW IN EVERY STATE!!!!

Yes, you got it, since the Washington State Constitution has been “rewritten” and then codified and placed into a statute which has been placed into the private copy righted compilation of books entitled . . . “The Revised Code of Washington” . . . , the court rules . . . can and do lawfully . . . “supercede” . . . the Washington State Constitution.

Yes, you got it, since the RCW Volume 0 Washington State Constitution is NOT the law, the Court Rules can therefore lawfully . . . “supercede” . . . the Washington State Constitution.

That’s because the RCW is NOT the law.  Parosa v. Tacoma, supra.

The same is true in all 50 plus federal district states.

Don’t believe it?

Please go visit your State Capital, go to the Office of the Secretary of State and ask for directions how to get to the Archives Division of the Secretary of State and go ask your State Archivist how many State Constitutions they have in Archives.

DO YOU REALLY WANT TO KNOW HOW CAN THE GOVERNMENT DO THIS????

FIRST ANSWER:  ALL STATE CONSTITUTIONS HAVE BEEN SUSPENDED AND PLACED INTO THE ARCHIVES DIVISION OF THE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE IN ALL 50 STATES,  EVER SINCE MARTIAL LAW WAS FIRST DECLARED IN 1860!!!!

SECOND ANSWER: THE U.S. CONSTITUTION HAS BEEN SUSPENDED SINCE 1860 WHEN MARTIAL LAW WAS FIRST DECLARED!!!!

Yes, that’s right, all States first original dejure State Constitutions in all 50 States have been . . . SUSPENDED!!!!

“The constitution and laws of a state are rarely attacked from the front; it is against secret and gradual attacks that a nation must chiefly guard.”

Emmerich de Vattel

All States Constitutions have been suspended and placed into . . . THE ARCHIVES DIVISION . . .  of the office of . . . THE SECRETARY OF STATE . . . in every State’s Capital.

Every States’s first original valid State Constitution has been suspended and have been placed into the Archives Division of the Office of the Secretary of State in each and every State’s Capital and is no longer in use.

What you think is the . . . STATE CONSTITUTION . . . in the current 2010 statute books is NOT the same constitution as the 1st Original Dejure Constitution!!!!

Please go read . . . THE RECONSTRUCTION ACTS!!!!

Then go look up the legal definition of the word . . . “ARCHIVES.”

THE FIFTH ARTICLE OF . . . “THE RECONSTRUCTION ACTS” . . . ORDERED ALL THE “States” in original jurisdiction to put . . . “NEW CONSTITUTIONS” . . . for the . . . “NEW STATES” . . .  in . . . “THE NEW UNION” . . . into effect at the end of the Civil War.

THIS WAS 100% ILLEGAL!!!!

BUT THEY DID IT ANYWAYS!!!!

        “Whether a Constitution shall be amended is a “political question,” but whether it has been legally amended is a “judicial question.”  McConaughy v. Secretary of State, 119 N.W. 408,  413, 106 Minn. 392 Words and Phrases “Political Question” And;

        “Courts are not deprived of the right to pass upon constitutionality of an amendment to an existing constitution on ground that question is “political question” over which courts have no control, since question of validity of the adoption of an amendment to constitution is a “judicial” and not a “political question”.  Graham v. Jones, 3 So.2d 761, 767, 198 La.507 Words and Phrases” “Political Question” And;

The 1st Original Dejure Constitution for every State in . . . “THE OLD UNION” . . .has been . . . “SUSPENDED” . . .  and placed into . . . “THE ARCHIVES DIVISION” . . . of the office of . . . “THE SECRETARY OF STATE” . . . in every new . . . “CORPORATE STATE”!!!!

“The constitution and laws of a state are rarely attacked from the front; it is against secret and gradual attacks that a nation must chiefly guard.”

Emmerich de Vattel

STILL DON’T BELIEVE THAT THE COURT RULES SUPERCEDE THE CONSTITUTION????

Here is some of the CrRLJ 1.1 & CrR 1.1 decisional law in Washington State that makes it crystal clear that . . .  SPEEDY TRIAL COURT RULES . . . SUPERCEDE . . . THE RCW SPEEDY TRIAL STATUTES . . . AND SUPERCEDE . . . THE CONSTITUTION:

    “It has been repeatedly held that rules governing courts of limited jurisdiction are mandatory and the failure to strictly comply with the rules results in a dismissal.  See State v. Sodorff, 84 Wn.2d 888, 529 P.2d 1066 (1975); State v. Carmody, 75 Wn.2d 615, 452 P.2d 959 (1969); State v. Gregory, 74 Wn.2d 696, 446 P.2d 191 (1968).  Likewise, the speedy trial rule applicable to superior courts, CrR 3.3 has been strictly enforced and noncompliance results in a dismissal.  State v. Williams, 85 Wn.2d 29, 530 P.2d 225 (1975), review denied, 88 Wn.2d 1006 (1977); State v. Espeland, supra; State v. Reid, supra; State v. Jack, 87 Wn.2d 467, 553 P.2d 1347 (1976).”  STATE v. TAYLOR, 17 Wn.App. 736, 740, 565 P.2d 102 (June 7, 1977).

            “CrR 3.3 provides in part:

        (a) Responsibility of Court.  It shall be the responsibility of the court to insure to each person charged with crime a speedy trial in accordance with the provisions of this rule.  ...(f) Dismissal With Prejudice.  A criminal charge not brought to trial as required by this rule shall be dismissed with prejudice. ...[1, 2] Dismissal is required under CrR 3.3 (f) if the case is not brought to trial in accordance with the rule.  A showing of prejudice to the defendant is uneccessary.”  STATE v. WILLIAMS,  85 Wn.2d 29, 31, 530 P.2d 225 [No. 43108.  En Banc.  January 9, 1975].  And;  

        “Because Ekstedt was not tried within the speedy trial period prescribed  by CrR 3.3(c)(2)(i), the charge against her should have been dismissed on proper motion.  State v. Greenwood, 120 Wn.2d 585, 607, 845 P.2d 971 (1993).  We reverse the conviction and order the charge dismissed with prejudice.”  STATE v. EKSTEDT, 70 Wn. App. 785, 788, 789, 855 P.2d 704 (August 2, 1993).  And;

         “[2] Criminal Law – Trial – Time of Trial – Continuance or Extension – Objection of Defendant – Notice  – Necessity.  A defendant cannot be penalized for failing to object to the resetting of a trial date when no notice of the change is ever given to the defendant. . . . As the State concedes, the record does not reflect why or when the case was continued beyond November 7, a date within the speedy trial rule.  Nor does the record show that the defendant received notice of the change of trial date.  Lacking notice, the defendant had NO obligation to object.  A defendant is NOT required to frame an objection to a trial date of which, at least insofar as this record reflects, he had no notice.  It is interesting that the case on which the State puts so much reliance for its position appears to reject as meritless a similar argument that defense counsel had an obligation to object to a trial date before the expiration of the CrR time period and before notice of a trial exceeding that time period.  Raper, 47 Wn.App. At 539.  Raper also should be read only to justify a properly requested 5-day continuance, not the open ended process reflected by this court.  As noted, the ultimate responsibility is on the court for bringing a defendant to trial within the speedy trial period. ...A defendant has no duty to bring himself to trial.  Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 517, 33 L.Ed. 2d 101, 92 S. Ct. 2182 (1972); Seattle v. Hilton,  62 Wn.App. 487, 491, 815 P.2d 808 (1991).  Lemly’s right to a speedy trial was violated.  As such we reverse the decision of the trial court and dismiss the charges with prejudice pursuant to CrR 3.3(i).”  STATE v. LEMLY, 64 Wn. App. 724, 828 P.2d 587 (March 23, 1992).  And;

        “We then quoted with approval our language in Port Angeles v. Dustin, 73 Wn.2d 712, 440 P.2d 420 (1968) as follows at 702:  These rules are mandatory, as are the statutes from which the language was taken.”  STATE v. CARMODY,  75 Wn.2d 615, 617 (April 3, 1969).  And;

        “Rather, we are dealing with a rule which demands strict compliance and, if not followed, requires dismissal of the charges.  State v. White, 94 Wn.2d 498, 501, 617 P.2d 998 (1980) Prejudice is NOT required to support a dismissal where trial is held beyond its time constraints.  State v. Williams, 85 wn.2d 29, 32, 530 P.2d 225 (1975).”  STATE v. GREENWOOD, 57 Wn.App. 854, 790 P.2d 1243 (May 15, 1990).  And;

        “This state has always been strict in its application of the speedy trial provisions of CrR 3.3.  “]P]ast experience has shown that unless a strict rule is applied, the right to a speedy trial as well as the integrity of the judicial process, cannot be effectively preserved.”  State v. Striker, 87 Wn.2d 870, 877, 557 P.2d 847 (1976).  [2] The dissent would have us believe there is some provision in CrR 3.3 which weighs the availability of the State’s witnesses, even the alleged victim, against the requirement to proceed to trial within a certain time frame. ...Because Mr. Kokot’s right to a speedy trial was violated, the conviction is vacated, and the charge dismissed.  CrR 3.3(i). . . . As in State v. Mack, 89 Wn.2d 788, 576 P.2d 44 (1978), the type of court congestion condemned by decisions under CrR 3.3 occurs when a court cannot timely set a case in the first instance because of a congested calendar.  State v. Palmer, 38 Wn.App. 160, 162, 684 P.2d 787 (1984).”  STATE v. KOKOT, 42 Wn.App. 733, 737, 738, 739, 713 P.2d 1121 (January 30, 1986).  And;

        “A criminal charge not brought to trial within the time period provided by the rule must be dismissed with prejudice.  CrR 3.3(i); White, at 501. . . . Strict compliance with the rule is required,  not substantial compliance, and when the rule is not followed, the case must be dismissed with prejudice.  White, at 501.”  STATE v. HELMS, 72 Wn.App. 273, 864 P.2d 23 (December 28, 1993).  And;

        “We have consistently held that the rules are mandatory.”  STATE v. SODORFF, 84 Wn.2d 888, 529 P.2d 1066 [No. 43337.  En Banc.  January 2, 1975.] And;

        “[1] We recently reiterated in Port Angeles v. Dustin, 73 Wn.2d 712, 440 P.2d 420 (1968):  These rules are mandatory, as are the statutes from which the language was taken. ...Seattle v. Reed,  6 Wn.2d 186, 107 P.2d 239 (1940); State v. Ladiges, 63 Wn.2d 230, 386 P.2d 416 (1963); Orting v. Rucschner, 66 Wn.2d 732, 404 P.2d 983 (1965); Seattle v. Buerkman, 67 Wn.2d 537, 408 P.2d 258 (1965).”  STATE v. GREGORY, 74 Wn.2d 696, 698 (October 17, 1968).  And;

        “[2] The provisions of the rule are mandatory.  When the condition of the record is such that the record is such that the rule applies, THE COURT HAS NO DISCRETION.  IT MUST, UPON MOTION, DISMISS THE ACTION.  State ex rel. Lytle v. Superior Court, 3 Wn. (2d) 702, 102 P. (2) 246; State ex rel.Goodnow v. O’Phelan, 6 Wn. (2d) 146, 151, 106 P. (2d) 1073; State ex rel. Seattle v. Superior Court, 6 Wn. (2d) 540, 108 P. (2d) 342; State ex rel. Woodworth & Cornell, v. Superior Court, 9 Wn. (2d) 37, 113 P. (2d) 527; State ex rel. Dawson v. Superior Court, 16 Wn. (2d) 300, 133 P. (2d) 285; Craig v. Clearwater Concentrating Co., 21 Wn. (2d) 530, 151 P. (2d) 828.”  STATE EX REL. W.W.P. Co. v. SUP CT., 41 Wn. (2d) 484, 488, 489 (November 13, 1952).  And;

        “[1-4] In State ex rel. Washington Water Power Co. v. Superior Court, 41 Wn. (2d) 484, 250 P. (2d) 536, we said of this rule:  “The provisions of this rule are mandatory.  When the condition of the record is such that the rule applies, the court has NO discretion.  It must, upon motion, dismiss the action.”  McDOWELL v. BURKE, 57 Wn.(2d) 794, 795 (March 2, 1961).  And;

        “CrR 3.3 provides in part:  (a) Responsibility of Court.  It shall be the responsibility of the court to ensure to each person charged with crime a speedy trial in accordance with the provisions of this rule.  ...(f) Dismissal With Prejudice.  A criminal charge not brought to trial as required by this rule shall be dismissed with prejudice.”  STATE v. GOLDTHORPE, 14 Wn. App. 268, 540 P.2d 455 (September 8, 1975).  And;

        “In the past we have opposed excusing speedy trial rule violations caused by administrative problems.  See State v. Mack, 89 Wn.2d 788, 794-95, 576 P.2d 44 (1978); see also City of Bremerton v. Hoyt, 44 Wn.App. 135, 138-39, 721 P.2d 657 (1985).  We should not abandon that position now.”  KENNEWICK v. VANDERGRIFF,  109 Wn.2d 99, 107, 743 P.2d 811 [No. 53438-1.  En Banc.  October 1, 1987.] And;

        “CrR 3.3 must be strictly enforced; dismissal with prejudice is required when the rule is not followed.  State v. White, supra at 501.  The purpose of an objection is to inform the trial court of an alleged error in order to permit timely correction of that error.  CrR 3.3(a) charges the trial court with the responsibility of ensuring a trial in accordance with the rule.  In order for the court to carry out this specific function, objections pursuant to CrR 3.3 must be specific enough to alert the court to the type of error involved.  As this court has observed in the somewhat different context of whether a defendant may raise a CrR 3.3 violation for the first time on appeal.”  STATE v. BERNHARD,  45 Wn. App. 590, 726 P.2d 991 600 (October 6, 1986).  And;

HOW IN THE HELL CAN COURT RULES SUPERCEDE THE STATUTES????

See the following statute RCW 2.04.190, which purports to grants the Washington State Supreme Court the alleged authority to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure.  State v. Fitzsimmons, 94 Wn.2d 858, 620 P.2d 999 (1980).  The Supreme Court has allegedly granted . . . “STATUTORY AUTHORITY” . . .  to promulgate rules that govern the practice and procedure in the courts.  State v. Smith, 84 Wn.2d 498, 501, 527 P.2d 674 (1974).  

        "RCW 2.04.200 Effect of rules upon statutes.

        When and as the rules of courts herein authorized shall be promulgated all laws in conflict therewith shall become of no further force or effect. [1925 ex.s.c 118 section 2; RRS section 132.] NOTES: Rules of court: Cf. CR 81(b), RAP 1.1(g)." State v. Smith, 84 Wn.2d 498, 503, 3 527 P.2d 674 (October 1974).  And;

        "CR 81(b) states: "Subject to provisions of section (a) of this rule, these rules supercede all procedural statutes and other rules that may be in conflict. ...Whenever there is a conflict between a procedural statute and a court rule, the court's rule making power is supreme.... The statute is consistent with the court rule. Petrarca v. Halligan, 83 Wn.2d 773, 776, 522 P.2d 827 (1974)." NEARING v. GOLDEN STATE FOODS, 114 Wn.2d 817, 819, 821, 822, 792 P.2d 500 [No. 55857-4. En Banc. June 7, 1990.1 And;

    

        “. . . all procedural rules in conflict shall be of no effect. [1989 c 227 section 5; 1984 c 258 section 7; 1961 c 299 section 8.] And;

    

        "It will be noticed that the Laws of 1925, Ex. Ses., p.187 (Rem. 1927 Sup., section 13-2), provides that,  "Sec. 2. When and as the rules of courts herein authorized shall be promulgated all laws in conflict therewith shall be and become of no further force or effect." STATE EX REL. FOSTERWYMAN LUM. CO. v. SUP'R CT., 148 Wash. 1, 13, [No. 21107. En Banc. May 29th, 1928.] And;

    

    

        "[1-3] There are several grounds which justify our rule. First, the legislature has authorized the Supreme court to adopt rules of procedure. RCW 2.04.190: "The supreme court shall have the power to prescribe ... the forms of all writs and all other process ... Quite apart from the statutory authority, this court has the inherent power to govern court procedures. State ex rel. Foster-Wyman Lumber Co. v. Superior Court, 148 Wash. 1, 267 P. 770 (1928). This stems from the constitutional provision that all judicial power of the state is vested in the Supreme Court and various other courts designated in the constitution. Const. art. 4, section 1." STATE v. FIELDS, 85 Wn.2d 126, 128, 129, 530 P.2d 284 [No. 43278. En Banc. January 10, 1975.1 And;

        “The town of Orting had elected to create a municipal court under the authority of RCW 3.50.010.  This statute provides that procedure in the municipal court is subject to the rule-making authority of the Supreme Court.  RCW 3.50.450.Thus, the controlling rules of procedure are found in the Traffic Rules for Courts of Limited Jurisdiction promulgated by this court,  effective July 1,  1963.  See JTR T2,  RCW vol. 0.  Orting v. Rucshner, 66 Wn 2d (Aug. 1965).  And;

        “Ordinarily, when a procedural rule has been promulgated, “all laws in conflict therewith “SHALL” be and become of no further force or effect.”  RCW 2.04.200 State v. Taylor, 83 Wn.2d 594, 521 P.2d 699 (1974).”  STATE v. HODGE, 11 Wn.App. 323, 328, 523 P.2d 953 (May 23,  1974).  And;

    “RCW 2.04.200 Effect of rules upon statutes.

        “[3] RCW 2.04.200 provides that rules of court adopted by the Supreme Court supercede conflicting statutory provisions.  See also State ex rel. Dep’t of Ecology v. Anderson, 94 Wn.2d 727, 731-32, 620 P.2d 76 (1980); Petrarca v. Halligan, 83 Wn.2d 773, 776, 522 P.2d 827 (1974).”  EMWRIGHT v. KING COUNTY, 96 Wn.2d 538, 637 P.2d 656 (December 10, 1981).  And;

        “Court rules of procedure are designed to eliminate or minimize any miscarriage of justice owing to previously existing rigid regulations governing the workings of the courts of the state, and reflect the power of the Supreme Court to establish procedural rules for the courts which, when in conflict with statutorily prescribed procedures, are the supreme authority.  Any inconsistencies between such statutes and rules must be resolved in favor of the rules. ...Where rule of court is inconsistent with the procedural statute, the power of this court to establish procedural rules for the courts of this state is supreme.”  PETRARCA v. HALLIGAN, 83 Wn.2d 773, 776, 522 P.2d 827 (May 19th, 1974).  And;

        

This fact is again declared and established for the district courts as well in RCW 3.30.080 to wit:

        “RCW 3.30.080 Rules.  The supreme court may adopt rules of procedure for district courts.  A district court may adopt local rules of procedure which are not inconsistent with state law or with the rules adopted by the supreme court.  The rules for a county with a single district and multiple facilities may include rules to provide where cases shall be filed and where cases shall be heard.  If the rules of the supreme court authorized under this section are adopted,all procedural rules in conflict shall be of no effect. [1989 c 227 section 5; 1984 c 258 section 7; 1961 c 299 section 8.] And;

IT IS UNDISPUTED THAT COURT RULES SUPERCEDE THE STATUTES!!!!

How in the hell can that be possible????

    

IT UNDISPUTED THAT COURT RULES SUPERCEDE THE STATE CONSTITUTIONS!!!!

I thought all the judges were bound by their oath and affirmation to obey and follow the State Constitution????

IT IS UNDISPUTED THAT COURT RULES SUPERCEDE THE U.S. CONSTITUTION!!!!

I thought the U.S. Constitution was . . . THE SUPREME LAW OF THE LAND????

WHAT’S GOING ON HERE????????????????????????

See Parosa v. Tacoma, which clearly reads:

 “But the legislature specifically disclaimed any intention to change the meaning of any statute.  The compilers of the code were not empowered by congress to amend existing law, and doubtless had no thought of doing so ...”   ...the act before us does not purport to amend a section of an act, but only a section of a compilation entitled “REVISED CODE OF WASHINGTON,” WHICH IS NOT THE LAW.  Such an act purporting to amend only a section of the prima facie compilation leaves the law unchanged. En Banc.”  PAROSA v. TACOMA, 57 Wn.(2d) 409  (Dec.22, 1960).

THE RCW IS NOT THE LAW!!!!

So why do I have to pay the speeding ticket?

THE REVISED CODE OF WASHINGTON STATUTES ARE NOT THE LAW!!!!

So why do I have to pay the $150.00 no seat belt ticket????

THE RCW IS NOT THE LAW!!!!

So why do I have to pay the $550.00 no insurance ticket which all goes in to the judges retirement funds????

THE STATUTES ARE NOT THE LAW!!!!

If the State Constitution says I don’t have to pay any . . .  “FEES IN ADVANCE” . . . in a criminal case,  why do I have to pay any attorney a . . . RETAINER????

MESSIANIC RABBI BRIAN KEITH at telephone: 1 - (815) 978-0592 or E-Mail to: <brianmeyer@icglp.com> or <brianmeyer (at) icglp.com> who is part of the  . . . <UCC-REDEMPTION@yahoogroups.com> calls an . . . “ATTORNEYS RETAINER” . . . the . . .  “GIFT OF THE GOYIM.”

A "retainer" is a sum of money paid by a client to secure an attorney's availability to work for a client. The fee paid is considered earned at the time of payment because the attorney is entitled to the money regardless of whether he actually performs any services for the client, and the funds shall not be placed into the attorneys trust account. Baranowski v. State Bar, 154 Cal.Rptr. 752, 593 P.2d 613 (1979); and the Washington State Bar News, Committee Reports, Formal Opinion No. 173.

THE RCW 9A.04.110 (24) WASHINGTON STATE CONSTITUTION IS NOT THE LAW!!!!

So why do I have to submit to a “breathalyzer” and produce “evidence” which could be used against me in court of law in violation of article 1, section 7 of the so called Washington State Constitution????

THAT’S BECAUSE THE REVISED CODES OF WASHINGTON ARE NOT THE LAW!!!!

The same is true in every federal district State.

THE STATUTES IN ALL 50 PLUS FEDERAL DISTRICT STATES ARE NOT THE LAW!!!!

THE RCW VOLUME 0 WASHINGTON STATE CONSTITUTION IS NOT THE LAW!!!!

SO WHY DO THE JUDGES DENY MY MOTIONS TO DISMISS BASED UPON THE COMMON LAW????

“Ye are of your father the devil, and the lusts of your father ye will do: he hath been a murderer from the beginning, and abode not in the truth, because there is no truth in him.  When he speaketh a lie, then speaketh of he of his own: for he is a liar, and the father thereof.”  John 8:44

The CrR 1.1 and CrRLJ 1.1 decisional case law says that they cannot take away a common law right without setting up an adequate substitute.

Justice Tolman,  J. (Concurring) in Blanchard v. Golden Age Brewing Co., No. 25813 En Bank.  December 7, 1936, 188 wash. 396, 426-427;  stated in part;

        “In my opinion, the legislature my take away from the courts, as now established, the power to protect certain rights and to exercise certain remedies, provided that it supplies a reasonably adequate remedy in the place of the one abolished, but by the same token the legislature may not  abolish a common law right and its remedy without setting up some reasonable substitute.  to attempt to do so is to deny due process of law within the meaning of both the state and Federal Constitutions.  Crane v. Hahlo, 258 U. S. 142, 42 S Ct. 214, Truax v. Corrigan,  257 U. S. 312, 42 S. Ct. 124, 27 A. L. R. 375; New York Central R. Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 37 S. Ct. 247, Ann. Cas. 1917D, 629, L. R.  A. 1917D, 1; Hanfgarn v. Mark, 289 N. Y. S. 143; In re Opinion of Justices, 211 Mass. 618, 98 N. E. 337.  This state is committed to that doctrine.  The question, while not very clearly set forth, was necessarily decided in State ex rel. Davis-Smith Co. v. Clausen, 65 Wash. 156, 117 Pac. 1101, 37 L. R. A. (N. S.) 466, and State v. Mountain Timber Co., 75 Wash. 581, 135 Pac. 645, L. R. A. 1917D, 10.  The rule was clearly stated and followed by this court in the case of Casco Co. v. Thurston County, 163 Wash. 666, 2P.  (2d) 677, 77 A. L. R. 622.  Because of the space already given to this case this case, I shall not cite further authorities.  It is sufficient to say that whether this be the majority rule or not, clearly it is the reasonable rule and the one we have adopted.”   Blanchard v. Golden Age Brewing Co., 188 Wash. 396, 426-727 (December 7, 1937).

I have the right to claim the protections of the “common law” pursuant to the Anglo American law, the Saxon Law form,  long ago established, antecedent to constitutions or statutes.

    “There are certain principles of natural justice inherent in the Anglo-Saxon character, which need no expression in constitutions or statutes to give them effect or to secure dependencies against legislation manifestly hostile to their real interests.” [182 U.S. 244, 281]. . . .  DOWNES v BIDWELL, 182 U.S. 244 (1901).

YOUR MOTION ON THE COMMON LAW IS DENIED . . . SAYS THE THIEF IN BLACK ROBES OF TREASON!!!!

YOUR MOTION ON THE STATUTE IS DENIED . . .  SAYS THE ARROGANT PRICK JUDGE!!!!

YOUR MOTION ON THE STATE CONSTITUTION IS DENIED . . . SAYS THE JESUIT PRIEST WHO IS THE THIEF IN BLACK ROBES OF TREASON!!!!

YOUR MOTION ON THE U.S. CONSTITUTION IS DENIED . . . SAYS THE JESUIT PRIEST WHO IS THE THIEF IN BLACK ROBES OF TREASON!!!!

COURT RULES SUPERCEDE THE STATUTE . . . SAYS THE POMPOUS JUDGE!!!!

COURT RULES SUPERCEDE THE STATUTES BECAUSE THE STATUTES ARE NOT THE LAW PAROSA v. TACOMA, SUPRA.

Yes,  you got it,  if the RCW state statutes are NOT the law,  then the Washington State Constitution is NOT the law pursuant to Parosa v. Tacoma, supra.

THERE IS SIMILAR CASE LAW IN ALL 50 PLUS FEDERAL DISTRICT STATES!!!!

In most STATES, the constitution is called the general law or a general statute.

In most STATES, the drunk driving statutes, speeding statutes, running a red light statute, improper turn statute, broken tail light statute, etc., are all called . . . “special statutes” . . .  or . . . “specific statutes.”

SPECIFIC STATUTES SUPERCEDE GENERAL STATUTES!!!!

SPECIFIC STATUTES SUPERCEDE THE CONSTITUTION!!!!

See the “special/general statute” rule.  The operation of that rule is explained in State v. Shriner, 101 Wn.2d 576, 580, 681 P.2d 237 (1984) and reads in part:

        “It is a well established rule of statutory construction that where a special statute punishes the same conduct which is punished under a general statute, the special statute applies and the accused can be charged only under that statute.  It is not relevant that the special statute may contain additional elements not contained in the general statute. . . . The determining factor is that the statutes are concurrent in the sense that the general rule will be violated in each instance where the special statute has been violated.”  State v. Shriner, 101 Wn.2d 576, 580, 681 P.2d 237 (1984).

“In other words, the special statute will supercede the general only ‘[s]o long as it is not possible to commit the special crime without also committing the general crime.”  State v. Walker, 75 Wn.App. 101, 105, 879 P.2d 957 (1994), review denied, 125 Wn.2d 1015 (1995) (court’s emphasis), quoting State v. Shriner, 101 Wn.2d at 583.  It is an equally familiar rule of construction that when one statutory provision deals with a subject in a general way and another deals with the same subject in a specific way, the specific provision is controlling:

        “This interpretation also is indicated by the familiar rule of statutory provision which deals with a subject in a general way and another which deals with the same subject in a specific manner, the latter will prevail.  State ex rel. Phillips v. State Liquor Control Bd., 59 Wn.2d 565 P.2d 844 (1962).  See also Knowles v. Holly, 82 Wn.2d 694, 702, 513 P.2d 18 (1973).

This is why all the judges will tell you that your motion to dismiss based upon the Constitution is denied!

This is why all the judges will tell you that the only thing that we are going to look at today is . . . THE SPECIFIC STATUTE . . . you have been charged with violating and the case law that interprets that specific statute!

YOUR MOTION TO DISMISS THE RESULTS OF THE BREATHALYZER BASED UPON THE FIFTH AMENDMENT IS DENIED!

“Ye are of your father the devil, and the lusts of your father ye will do: he hath been a murderer from the beginning, and abode not in the truth, because there is no truth in him.  When he speaketh a lie, then speaketh of he of his own: for he is a liar, and the father thereof.”  John 8:44

YES, THE JUDGES HAVE CREATED AN ALICE IN WONDERLAND COURT SYSTEM WHERE THE LAW IS THE WORDS THAT COME OUT OF THEIR MOUTHS!

YES, THE JUDGES CAN DENY YOUR MOTIONS BASED UPON THE ARTICLES AND SECTIONS OF YOUR STATUTORY CONSTITUTION AND TELL YOU THAT COURT RULES SUPERCEDE THE STATUTES.

BUT WAIT, THAT VIOLATES MARBURY v. MADISON!!!!

In Marbury v Madison,  the court said (John Marshal),  in part;

    "It is,  emphatically, the province and duty of the judicial department, to say what the law is....the court must determine which of these conflicting rules governs the case;  this is the very essence of judicial duty.”  Marbury v Madison, 5 U.S.(1 Cr.)137,  2 L.Ed. 60 (1803).

What do you mean, . . .  “the court must determine which of these conflicting rules governs the case”?????

In Puget Sound Gillnetters vs. Moos, 88 Wn.2d 677, 687, 565 P.2d 1151 (1977) this court said:

    

    “It is the duty of judges to declare and not to make the law.  Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15.”  Puget Sound Gillnetters vs. Moos, 88 Wn.2d 677, 687, 565 P.2d 1151 (1977).

I thought statutes were the law!

Court rules are not the law!

When did we give authority to the Supreme Court of any State to legislate and make law????

When did we give authority to any State Supreme Court to make . . . “court rules” . . .  that purport to supercede the so called statute laws that I thought were passed by the State legislature????

The 9 men who compose the State Supreme Court in all 50 plus States promulgate the court rules in all 50 plus states.

How can a judge deny my motion upon the statute law that was enacted by the State Legislature and tell me that the court rule supercedes the statute?

Why is it when I ask the judge to state his “findings” on the record and state for the record how or why a court rule which is not the law could possibly purport to supercede the statute law that was passed by the State Legislature that judge tells you that he can’t give you legal advice from the bench and then suggest you seek competence counsel . . . “from someone who is an attorney in good standing of the State Bar Association,” . . .  IS THE FOX GUARDING THE HEN HOUSE OR WHAT IS GOING ON HERE????

The judges have a paramount duty to declare . . . “what the law is” . . . not to make it up from the bench!            

In Marbury v Madison,  the court said (John Marshal),  in part;

    "It is,  emphatically, the province and duty of the judicial department, to say what the law is....the court must determine which of these conflicting rules governs the case;  this is the very essence of judicial duty.”  Marbury v Madison, 5 U.S.(1 Cr.)137,  2 L.Ed. 60 (1803).

HERE IS SOME MORE WASHINGTON CASE LAW THAT CLEARLY SHOWS THAT . . . “THE PRIMA FACIE COMPILATION” . . . CALLED . . . THE REVISED CODE OF WASHINGTON . . . IS NOT THE LAW:

See Harland v. Territory, 3 Wash. T. 131 (1887),  which states in part:

        “An act to amend section 3050 of chapter 380 of the Code of Washington.”

        We have a book which is marked on the fly-leaf, “The Code of Washington.” I have examined it, and find that upon its face does not purport to contain any authenticated act of the legislative assembly of the territory of Washington.  It purports to have been edited and compiled by a private party.  It contains no titles to acts, no enacting clauses, no signature of president of council, speaker of the house, or governor.  It is not certified by the secretary to be or contain a true copy of any legislative act.  The chapters, divisions, and sections all purport to be the act of a private party.  His sections run up to 3327, and in the book is an unauthenticated provision that a certain private party shall publish parts of a certain class of laws which he shall deem to be general, and leave out certain parts of all acts, and leave out entirely others.  He certifies that he has examined all the laws embraced in the volume (the Code), etc., and put redundant matter in parentheses, and matters ommitted from enrolled laws but supplied by him are enclosed in brackets.  Now, it is clear that this book contains no act passed by the legislative assembly, and cannot be known officially what it does or does not contain.  We suppose that it is this private book that the act of 1883 purports to amend.  Acts of a legislature may amend other acts of its own. An act cannot amend the statutes of the United States or of another state, or the works of a private author.  Such an attempt is simply void, and beyond the legislative power.  The organic law of the territory provides that “every act of the legislature shall contain but one object, and that shall be expressed in its title.” ...The act is then void because it has no title expressing its object.” Harland v. Territory of Washington, 3 Wash. T. 131 (1887).

    See also In re Nolan, 21 Wash. 395, 396,398 (July 1899),  which states in part:

        “This act was entitled, “An act to amend Section 812 of the Code of Washington Territory”; and this court in the cases of State v. Halbert, 14 Wash. 306 (44 Pac. 538), and State v. Dillon, 14 Wash. 703 (46 Pac. 1119), it held the amendatory act void, for the reason that its object was not expressed in its title.”  In re Nolan, 21 Wash. 395, 396,398 (July 1899).  And;

    And see also State v. Halbert, 14 Wash. 307, 310, 314 (March 1896),  which states in part:

        “By section 2 of article 27 of the constitution, it was provided that all laws then in force in the Territory of Washington, which were not repugnant to the constitution, should remain in force until they should expire by their own limitation, or be repealed by the legislature.  If, therefore, the act in question was not in force at the time of the adoption of the state constitution, it necessarily follows that it never became the law of this state, and that the section which it attempted to amend is still the law.  Was it then in force?  The highest judicial tribunal of the territory said it was not, and for this reason, no doubt, it was omitted from the compilation of “existing laws;” and, under the circumstances, we do not think we ought to overrule its decisions.”  State v. Halbert, 14 Wash. 307, 310, 314 (March 1896).

    

    And see also Mudgett v Liebes, 14 Wash. 482 (May 14, 1896), which states in part:

        “The amendatory act contained no words of repeal, but even if it had that could not have affected the result.  In section 134 of Sutherland on Statutory Construction, it is said:  “Where there is an express repeal of an existing statute, and a re-enactment of it at the same time, or a repeal and a re-enactment of a portion of it, the re-enactment neutralizes the repeal so far as the old law is continued in force.  It operates without interruption where the re-enactment takes effect at the same time.   . . . Offices are not lost; corporate existence is not ended; inchoate statutory rights are not defeated; a statutory power is not taken away, nor criminal charges affected by such repeal and re-enactment of the law on which they respectively depend.”  In State, ex rel. Blossom, Horton, 21 Nev. 300 (30 Pac. 876), the rule applicable to the present question is stated to be as follows:  “The effect of an amendment of a statute made by enacting that the ‘act s hereby amended so as to read as follows,’ and then incorporating the changes or additions with that portion of the former act that is retained, is not that the portion of the amended act which are merely copied from the original act are to be considered as having been repealed and again re-enactment.  The part which remains unchanged is to be considered as having continued to be the law from the time of its first enactment.”  See also Martindale v. Martindale, 10 Ind. 566; State v. Mines, 38 W.Va. 125 (18 S.E. 470); McLaughlin v. Mayor of Newark, 57 N.J. Law, 298 (30 Atl. 543); Sutherland, Statutory Construction, section 134.  Our Constitution requires (art. 2, section 37) that where a section of an act is amended the section must be set forth at length, and it follows from this that part of the original section which is not repeated in the amendatory act is repealed, but that part of the original enactment which is repeated remains the same as if there had been no amendment.”  Mudgett v Liebes, 14 Wash. 482 (May 14, 1896).

And see also State ex rel. v. Superior Court,  28 Wash. at 324 (1902), which states in part:

        “It is very properly suggested by counsel that Judge Ballinger has prepared a Code which is of great convenience to the bench and bar of the state, but that Code cannot be said to be clothed with authority equal to that of the Code of 1881.  The later is purely a legislative product, while the former is a private compilation,  which has simply received the approval of the legislature as an official compilation of existing statutes, but of no greater authority than all other existing official compilations of session laws of the state.  See Session Laws 1899, P.109, section 1 Ballinger’s Code was not enacted by the legislature, as was the Code of 1881, but was approved as a compilation of laws for the purpose of reference, as provided in section 2 of the act of 1899, above cited. ...such mere reference to the sections of a private compilation, although ably and carefully prepared, and even recognized by the legislature as an official compilation, cannot take the place of the constitutional requirement that the title of an act shall contain some statement indicating the actual thing of which the law treats. In State v. Halbert, 14 Wash. 306 (44 Pac. 538), it was held that an act of 1885-86, attempting to amend a section of the Code of 1881 by mere reference to its number in the title of the amending act, was void.”  State ex rel. v. Superior Court,  28 Wash. at 324 (1902).  And;

    And see also Spokane, P. & S. R. Co. v. Franklin County, 106 Wash. 2126, 31 (March 4, 1919),  which states in part:

        “STATUTES (75)–CODES–CONSTRUCTION.  A compiler’s codification of several independent acts, without official sanction, does not control construction, and any superceded matter must be disregarded and omitted matter searched out and given effect. ...the compiler’s idea of what now remains as law of the many enactments of the legislature.  But the compilation has no official sanction in the sense that it controls the construction the court must put upon the several acts. If it includes matter superseded, the matter must be rejected, and if there are matters not superseded and not contained therein, they must be searched out and given effect.”  Spokane, P. & S. R. CO. v. Franklin County, 106 Wash. 212 (March 4.  1919).   And;

    The rule was stated by this court in Spokane, Portland & Seattle R.Co. v. Franklin County, 106 Wash. 21, 179 Pac. 113 (March 4, 1919), as follows:

        “...But the compilation has no official sanction in the sense that it controls the construction the court must put upon the several acts. If it includes matter superseded, the matter must be rejected, and if there are matters not superseded and not contained therein, they must be searched out and given effect.”  It is believed by the undersigned Committee members that the code, if it is passed in its present form, will lead to much confusion and mistake, and will vastly increase the amount of work involved in the examination of any legal problem, because the changes in language are so numerous that no section in the new code can be accepted as correctly stating the law as enacted. ...In this respect, the 1951 legislature was following its own unconstitutional device for amending a section of an act in disregard of the specific constitutional mandate. The act before us does not purport to amend a section of an act, but only a section of a compilation entitled “Revised Code of Washington,” which is not the law.  Such an act purporting to amend only a section of the prima facie compilation leaves the law unchanged. En Banc.”  Spokane, Portland & Seattle R.Co. v. Franklin County, 106 Wash. 21, 179 Pac. 113 (March 4, 1919).  And;

    See also Naccarato v. Sullivan, 46 Wn.(2d) 67, 74,77 (January 6, 1955) which states in part:

        “We stated the tests to be applied in determining whether an act is complete:

        “They are: Can a person of ordinary intelligence mistake its meaning? Can we know what the legislature intended, without referring to any other act or statute?”  Naccarato v. Sullivan, 46 Wn.(2d) 67, 74,77 (January 6, 1955).

    See also Parosa v. Tacoma, 57 Wn.(2d) 409, 411, 412, 413, 415, 421  (Dec.22, 1960), which reads:

        “The original code committee, created by Laws of 1941 chapter 149, p. 418, consisted of the State Law Librarian, the law librarian of the University of Washington, and the executive secretary of the judicial council. By section 2 of that , the committee was directed to adopt a complete re-compilation of the statute law of the state, but was not endowed with power to change the law. Two mimeographed volumes, containing the work product of the committee’s employed staff, were deposited in the office of the secretary of state, but the text thereof was never presented to the legislature.  The committee never approved it. One member alone recommended the adoption of the compilation as a prima facia code.   A majority of the committee, in a report to the legislature dated January 13, 1949 strongly opposed adoption even as a prima facia code primarily because of the failure of its employed staff to observe its admonition not to tinker with the meaning of the statutes. Nevertheless, the two volumes then resting in the offices of the secretary of state were adopted by reference only as a prima facie compilation of the state’s statute law. Laws of 1950, Ex Ses., chapter 16, p.33. But the legislature specifically disclaimed any intention to change the meaning of any statute. The compilers of the Code were not empowered by Congress to amend existing law, and doubtless had no thought of doing so ...” Warner v. Goltra, 293 U.S. 155, 161, 79 L. Ed. 254, 55 S. Ct. 46.  The text of section 2 of the act (Laws of 1950, Ex. Ses., chapter 16, p.33) is as follows:  “The contents of said code shall establish prima facie the laws of this state of a general and permanent nature in effect on January 1, 1949, but nothing herein shall be construed as changing the meaning of any such laws. In case of any ommissions or any inconsistency between any of the provisions of said code and the laws existing immediately preceding this enactment, the previousely  existing laws shall control.”  Such is but a statement of the law relative to the standing of a compilation of statutes. In the event of a discrepency between the law enacted by the legislature and a compilation, the legislative acts control.”  Parosa v. Tacoma, 57 Wn.(2d) 409, 411, 412, 413, 415, 421  (Dec.22, 1960).  And;

    See also State ex rel. Weiks v. Tumwater,  66 Wn.(2d) 33, 36, 37 (April 8, 1965) which reads:

        “In Moon v. Smith, 138 Fla. 410, 416, 189 So. 835, a zoning ordinance provided: “The City of Orlando is hereby divided into ten (10) districts aforesaid and the boundaries of such districts are shown upon the map attached thereto hereto and made a part of this ordinance being designated as the ‘District Map’ and said map and all the notations, references and other information shown thereon shall be as much a part of this ordinance as if the matters and information set forth by said map were all fully described herein.”  Finding that the map referred to was not, in fact, attached to the ordinance, the Florida court held, p. 418: The ordinance applied only to the map attached thereto and without such map so attached there was no description of the several zones attempted to be established contained in the ordinances.  A map or plat could have been otherwise identified in and made a part of the ordinance, but this was not done.  Because of the lack of definiteness of a description and location of the several zones, the ordinance was ineffectual to establish the several zones.  In Village of Williston Park v. Israel, 191 Misc. 6, 76 N.Y.S. 2d 605, 608, it was held: By reason of the failure to publish the map, to post the map, to include the map in the ordinance as published or to set forth that such map was on file in the office of the Village Clerk, and by reason of the failure of the ordinance to otherwise describe in the text of the ordinance the use districts attempted to be created, the ordinance is null and void. [2] The defects in the ordinance No. 246 were not remedied by the enactment of ordinance No. 437.  Ordinance No. 437 did not purport to re-enact No. 246.  The rule is: The general rule is that void ordinances cannot be amended and that an ordinance passed as an amendment to a previous ordinance, which never took effect, is invalid; a void ordinance cannot be vitalized by amendment, and re-enactment is necessary to validate that intended to be enacted by it.  Hence, where an ordinance is passed by one branch of the legislative body at one session, and is not passed by the other until the next session, it is void, and a later enactment cannot give it any validity.  Without question, where an ordinance is void, a subsequent ordinance, that cannot be enforced of itself, and that purports to amend a single section of the prior ordinance is invalid.  6 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations section 21.05, p. 183 (3d ed.).  The fact that the ordinances of the town of Tumwater, including the ordinances here in question,  had, prior to the commencement of the present action, been included in the codification of the ordinances of the town of Tumwater, as provided for by Laws of 1957, ch. 97, does not result in the re-enactment of the ordinances.  SUCH A STATUTE DOES NOT CONTEMPLATE THE RE-ENACTMENT OR THE REPUBLICATION OF THE ORDINANCES, BUT MERELY THEIR COMPILATION FOR CONVENIENT USE AND TO SIMPLIFY THE METHOD OF THEIR PROOF.  DEFECTS IN THE ORDINANCES OR IN THEIR ENACTMENT ARE NOT THEREBY CURED.  Barrett v. Chicago, M. & St. P.R.Co., 190 Iowa 509, 175 N.W. 950. [3] We are committed to the rule that we will sustain the trial court’s judgement upon any theory established by the pleadings and supported by the proof.  Lundberg v. Corporation of Catholic Archbishop of Seattle, 55 Wn.2d 77, 346 P.2d 164; Guerin v. Thompson, 53 Wn.2d 515, 335 P.2d 36.  The judgment is affirmed.  ROSELLLINI, C.J., DONWORTH, FINLEY and     WEAVER, JJ., concur.”  STATE EX REL. WEIKS v. TUMWATER, 66 Wn.(2d) 33, 36, 37 (April 8, 1965).  And;

    The following two cases,  State v. Estill,  55 Wn.2d 576, 582 [Nos. 33729, 33730.  En Banc.  February 4, 1960.] and Gerberding v. Munro,  134 Wn.2d 188, 208, 209 949 P.2d 1366 [No. 65059-4.  En Banc.] (January 8, 1998) make it clear that the Code of 1881 having a specific constitutional sanction and approval that the subsequent statutes do not have and this proves my point, the prior law governs and supercedes all the current private copy righted crap which Parosa v. Tacoma, supra,  already made clear that . . . “the revised code of Washington is not the law.”

        “. . . the controlling statute which was a territorial enactment and antedates the constitution itself.  Territorial laws have a specific constitutional sanction and approval which subsequent state statutes do not have.  Art.  XXVII, section 2, of the state constitution provides:  “All laws now in force in the Territory of Washington, which are not repugnant to this Constitution, shall remain in force until they expire by their own limitation, or are altered or repealed by the legislature: Provided, That this section shall not be construed as to validate any act of the legislature of Washington Territory granting shore or tide lands to any person, company or any municipal or private corporation.”  For a territorial statute to be invalid upon the ground that it is “repugnant to this Constitution,” it is necessary that there be some provision of the constitution which can be said to conflict with it.  Thus, as an example, the territorial act providing for the extra judicial settlement of claims arising out of the relocation of roads became invalid by necessary implication in the light of Art. 1, section 16, of the constitution which vested eminent domain proceedings exclusively in the courts.  State statutes are continuously subject to scrutiny as to the propriety of their titles or the number of their subjects and are invalidated when the courts are not satisfied with them in this regard.  Not so territorial acts.  They are validated by the constitution itself.  Thus, the territorial legislative technique of enactment is put beyond the reach of the court upon such grounds.  Our constitutional forefathers were aware of the contempt statutes.  They put no provision in the constitution “repugnant” to them.  Under the validating provision in the constitution, the act of adopting it constituted a formal validation of the territorial acts in question.  I think the courts are neither above the constitution nor the constitutionally validated territorial contempt statutes.”  State v. Estill, 55 Wn.2d 576, 582 [Nos. 33729, 33730.  En Banc.  February 4, 1960.] And;

                    

        “This then existing qualification was recognized by the Washington Constitution upon its adoption in 1889 via art. XXVII, section 2, which recognized and retained all territorial laws then in effect.  See Wash. CONST. art. XXVII, section 2; In re Bartz, 47 Wn.2d 161, 167, 287 P.2d 119 (1955); State v. Estill, 55 Wn.2d 576, 582, 349 P.2d 210, 89 A.L.R.3D 1251 (1960) (Mallery, J., concurring) (noting the provisions of WASH. CONST. art. XXVII, section 2, and stating: “Territorial laws have a specific constitutional sanction and approval which subsequent state statutes do not have.”).”  Gerberding v. Munro,  134 Wn.2d 188, 208, 209 949 P.2d 1366 [No. 65059-4.  En Banc.] (January 8, 1998).  And;

It is undisputed that the current Washington State Supreme Court has twice recognized the Validity and Supremacy of the 1878 Walla Walla Constitution upon which the Territorial Code of 1881 was enacted in pursuance to,  by specifically stating that:

        “Territorial laws have a specific constitutional sanction and approval which subsequent state statutes do not have.”  State v. Estill, 55 Wn.2d 576, 582 [Nos. 33729, 33730.  En Banc.  February 4, 1960.] and Gerberding v. Munro,  134 Wn.2d 188, 208, 209 949 P.2d 1366 [No. 65059-4.  En Banc.] (January 8, 1998).  And;

Two times, the Washington State Supreme Court has also made it clear that all subsequent state statutes specifically referring to the current Revised Code of Washington do NOT have a specific constitutional sanction or approval, because they already knew the Volume 0 Revised Code of Washington was a fraud on the people.

DO NOT LET ANYONE TELL YOU THAT YOU CANNOT USE OLD CASE LAW!!!!

THE OLD CASE LAW IS A HUNDRED IF NOT A THOUSAND TIMES BETTER!!!!

Because the Territorial Code of 1881 was based upon the 1878 Walla Walla Constitution and a “legitimate legislature” in a three (3) branch government system that NO longer exists, and due to the fact the the STATE OF WASHINGTON government is made of a two (2) branch government that now exist,  it can never be changed for the reasons stated in Parosa v. Tacoma, supra, that: “...no section in the new code can be accepted as correctly stating the law as enacted,” and for the following reasons:

1.)  The Pierce’s Perpetual Code purported to adopt and “amend” the Territorial Code of 1881.

2.)  The Ballinger’s Code purported to adopt and “amend” the “prima facie compilation” as printed and copyrighted in the Pierce’s Perpetual Code.

3.)  The Remington Revised Code purported to adopt and “amend” the “prima facie compilation” as printed and copyrighted in the Ballinger’s Code.

4.)  The Revised Code of Washington purported to adopt and “amend” the “prima facie compilation” as printed and copyrighted in the Remington Revised Code.

        “But the legislature specifically disclaimed any intention to change the meaning of any statute.  The compilers of the Code were not empowered by Congress to amend existing law, and doubtless had no thought of doing so ...”  Warner v. Goltra, 293 U.S. 155, 161, 79 L. Ed. 254, 55 S. Ct. 46.  ...The act before us does not purport to amend a section of an act, but only a section of a compilation entitled “Revised Code of Washington,” which is not the law.  Such an act purporting to amend only a section of the prima facie compilation leaves the law unchanged. En Banc.”  PAROSA v. TACOMA, 57 Wn.(2d) 409, 411, 412, 413, 415, 421  (Dec.22, 1960)

It is crystal clear that every single legislative act since 1881 has merely been “amendments” to the “amendments” to the “amendments” to the “amendments” of a section of the prima facie compilation entitled “Revised Code of Washington” which leaves the law unchanged.  Parosa v. Tacoma, supra.

It is undisputed that the Revised Code of Washington is the Territorial Code of 1881 revised.

I HOPE THAT ALL OF YOU PEOPLE OUT THERE WILL START TO UNDERSTAND THAT NOT ONLY HAVE I FIGURED OUT HOW THEY (THOSE WHO CALL THEMSELVES THE JEW) GET AWAY WITH ALL THIS CRAP IN VIOLATION OF OUR SO CALLED CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS,  BUT THAT I HAVE ALSO FIGURED OUT THE SOLUTION ON HOW TO UNDO ALL THIS CRAP AND BRING US BACK TO ORIGINAL JURISDICTION BY SHOWING THEM THE MIRROR,  I GRAB THE PUPPY (NEANDERTHAL MAN OR HUMAN) BY THE SCRUFF OF HIS STIFF NECK AND RUB HIS HOOK SHAPED NOSE IN HIS OWN DOO DOO AND SHOW HIM THAT HE HAS EITHER MISAPPLIED THE STATUTE AS APPLIED TO ME OR THAT THE 80 IQ OR LESS ANDROID COP HAS CHARGED ME WITH THE WRONG STATUTE ALL TOGETHER . . . OR . . .  JUST MAYBE THAT THE RCW STATUTES HE OR SHE HAS CHARGED ME WITH VIOLATING ARE NOT THE LAW!!!!

I have also figured out how to bind them down with the first original dejure State Constitutions.

THIS IS JUST THE BEGINNING OF WHAT I CAN DO FOR ANYONE IN ALL 50 PLUS STATES IF YOU HAVE ME COME AND DO THE RESEARCH ON YOUR STATE MOTOR VEHICLE CODES AND IN YOUR STATE CONSTITUTIONS TO GET BACK OUR LAND RIGHTS, OUR RIGHT TO OWN LAND, WATER RIGHTS, GOLD MINING, GETTING OUR PROPERTY OFF THE PROPERTY TAX ROLLS, STOPPING THE NON-JUDICIAL FORECLOSURE PROCESSES, ETC.

It is undisputed that the Territorial Code of 1881 is the Statute Law or Session Law passed by the Legislature and prevails over and supercedes any restatement thereof in the Revised Code of Washington.  State ex rel. etc. v. Mercer Isl.,  58 Wn. (2d) 141, 144 (April 20, 1961.)

In anticipation that all . . . “THE INCOMPETENT FECKLESS PETTY FOGGER WANNABE JEW . . . BAR ASSOCIATION ATTORNEYS” . . . of the criminally corrupt Washington State Bar Association and every other just as criminally corrupt State Bar Association from all 50 plus other “corporate states” will attempt to argue that there has been a change in the language of the statute under which these statutory charges are brought,  it is submitted that the change is inapplicable,  and ineffective to change the result required,  as the previously existing laws control pursuant to the controlling Rules & Statutes,  Article XXVII Section 1 of the Washington State Corporate Charter RCW Volume 0 Phony Code [constitution] (sic) states in part:

        “...that all previous rights,  actions,  suits,  proceedings,  contracts or claims...shall continue as if no change had taken place.”  And;

The federal Constitution also has a similar provisions at 1 Stat 122 and 2 Stat 298; and bring forward and certify and exemplify the law in pursuance to U.S. Constitution art 4 section 1 (1787, 1789 as amended in (1791)),  and the RCW’s contain a similar provision at RCW 1.04.021.  In construing the codes in title 46,  then,  the codes themselves are merely prima facie evidence of the law as recognized in "RCW 1.04.021.  Rules of construction--Prima facie law (1950);  The contents of said code shall establish prima facie the laws of this state of a general and permanent nature in effect on January 1,  1949,  but nothing herein shall be construed as changing the meaning of any such laws.  In case of any omissions,  or any inconsistency between any of the provisions of said code and the laws existing immediately preceding this enactment,  THE PREVIOUSLY EXISTING LAWS SHALL CONTROL. [1950 ex.s. c 16 section 2]".  And;

        "Those statutes stand unrepealed,  unabridged and unaltered and should be held to declare the law of this state."  State v. Williams,  85 Wn.2d 29,  530 P.2d 225 (Jan. 1975).

        

        "The court has no authority to abrogate by rule a right guaranteed by the constitution."  State v. Pavelich,  150 Wash. 411,  273 P. 182 (1928).

The Washington State Supreme Court has recognized that it has no authority to abrogate a constitutional requirement by enactment of a court rule.  State v. Pelkey, 109 Wn.2d 484, 745 P.2d 854 (1987); Accord State v. Lutman, 26 Wn.App. 766, at 768,  614 P.2d 224 (1980).

All the attorneys, all the prosecutors and all the judges in all 50 plus corporate States falsely claims that it (the State) operates under the color of law,  which follows fictions of law,  and fictions must follow the law,  so there must a lawful law first,  and out of that they can create fictions of law (i.e. hypothetical situations) the jews will go in and create cases against themselves with minor consequences that sets precedence that they can use against the goyim to hold them down and suppress their rights,  but most of the fictions that they create,  there is no law as a foundation because fictions have to follow the law and the State again claims to operate under the color law again based upon fictions,  again there must be a lawful law for a fiction to be created.

Do you understand why they call them . . .  ATTORNEYS . . .  AT LAW????

Do you understand what . . . “JURISDICTION IN THE PREMISES” . . . MEANS????

See page 94 of the 1st legislation defining Territory and Territory of Washington.

The major proposition (premise) in Rafferty was that the act of the legislature on December 13, 1889 Session Laws’ 1889-90, Page 94) and § 24 of the Enabling Act went un-rebutted and no claim was made as to constitutionality of said legislative act and Enabling Act, § 24 as construed.

The minor proposition (premise) in this paper with respect to the above premise is that above said legislative act was not done according to the major proposition (premise) of the Washington constitution in Article 2, § 18 in which:

    "§ 18.  The style of the laws of the state shall be: 'Be it enacted by the legislature of the State of Washington.'

And no law shall be enacted except by bill."

AND THERE WAS NO BILL FOR THIS IN WASHINGTON STATE????

IT JUST MAGICALLY APPEARED ON THE REPORT OF THE LEGISLATIVE SESSION LAWS!!!!

The Session Laws 1889-90, Page 94, reveals that there was no such style of laws per Article 2, § 18 of the Washington Constitution and there was no Bill, it just appeared on the report of the legislative session laws.  Thus, the above said act did amount to no more than giving definitions of what "Territory" and "Territory of Washington" mean in any legislation in which the words "State" and "State of Washington" are used, if constitutional.

In addition to the foregoing, RCW 46.04.360, under the section titled "Nonresident," reads:  "Nonresident" means any person whose residence is outside this state and who is temporarily sojourning WITHIN THIS STATE.  [1961 c 12 § 46.04.360.  Prior:  1959 c 49 § 37; prior:  (i) 1943 c 153 § 1, part; 1937 c 188 § 1,  part; Rem. Supp. 1943 § 6312-1, part.  (ii) 1937 c 189 § 1, part;  RRS § 6360-1, part.] (emphasis added)

ARE YOU REALLY DRIVING A MOTOR VEHICLE IN THIS STATE????

ARE YOU REALLY DRIVING A MOTOR VEHICLE WITHIN THIS STATE????

REALLY, WHAT FEDERAL AREA WOULD THAT BE????

See RCW 82.04.200  "In this state" and  "WITHIN THIS STATE"  "IN THIS STATE" and "WITHIN THIS STATE" includes all federal areas lying within the exterior boundaries of the state.  [1961 c 15 82.04.200.  Prior:  1955 c 389  21;  prior L  1949 c 228 2,  part;  1945 c 249 1,  part;  1943 c 156 2,  part;  1941 c 178 2,  part;  1939 c 225 2,  part; 1937 c 227 2,  part;  1935 c 180 5,  part;  Rem. Supp. 1949 8370-5,  part.] (emphasis added).  And;

SO DO YOU REALLY BELIEVE THAT YOU LIVE IN A STATE????

        “Respondent contends article 2(a) RCW 9.100.010 supports its argument that “state”, as used in RCW 9.95.120, includes the United States.  However reference to article 2(a) supports petitioner’s contention.  Article 2(a) specifically defines “state” to include the United States, making it clear that when the legislature intends the word “state” to include the federal jurisdiction., it has done so with language clearly manifesting that intent.”  IN RE LEHMAN, 93 Wn.2d 25, 27, 28 [No. 46150.  En Banc.  January 10, 1980.] And;

Although this is NOT a direct quote from the following case, it is a proper statement because it’s a fact that under Title 42 Section 1981 & 1982, it lays out that U.S. citizens have the “same and like rights” which do not mean “identical rights,” whereas a U.S. citizen only has “statutory rights” as opposed to “white citizens” who have “civil liberties” under the “common law,” therefore a  “U.S. Citizen” upon leaving the District of Columbia becomes involved in “interstate commerce,”   as a “resident” does not have the common-law right to travel, as does a Citizen of one of the several states.  Hendrick v. Maryland S.C. Reporter’s Rd. 610-625. (1941),  whereas a white citizen is non-resident alien to the United States Corporation.

NO, I AM NOT A WHITE SUPREMACIST, BECAUSE I’M NOT WHITE!!!!

THE CIA CREATED THE WHITE SUPREMACIST ORGANIZATIONS AS PART OF THE DIALECTICS.

"This state" as stated in the above code section is not one of the united States of America in original jurisdiction, nor is it part of The State of Washington.  

See page 94 Session laws of 1889-90, December 13, 1889, making by legislative fiat, "State" or "State of Washington" in the law mean, Territory or Territory of Washington.

See also RCW 2.04.050 Style of process.  Its process shall run in the name of the “State of Washington,” bear test in the name of the chief justice, be signed by the clerk of the court, and made returnable according to law, or such rule or orders as may be prescribed by the court.  Enacted Laws 1890 p 323 section 11.  See RRS section 6.

The First Session Laws of 1889-90, at page 26, enacted provisions to purchase Barton's Hand-Book and Legislature Manual of Washington.  At page 37 of this book are the words "STATE OF WASHINGTON,” prefacing by itself, the Enabling Act and the Constitution.  The intent of Senate Joint Resolution No. 33, page 792 of the Session Laws of 889-90, was carried to it's completion.  The original and independent authority, of Article XXVII of the constitution was used to create a parallel government not  authorized by the Constitution and certainly not republican in form.

The unconstitutional "statutory courts," with no Constitutional power, can only take jurisdiction in the premises of the case which is the law (private law) of the case or at law and only hear the issue as predicated through the syllogisms in the complaint as purviewed through or defined in the "Territorial Code" which is further laid out in your code, in particular RCW 82.04.200., excise and occupational tax, ""In this state" or "within this state" includes all Federal areas lying within the exterior boundaries of the state of Washington."  Includes as defined in Black's Law Dict., page 687, "to shut up, keep within".  "Jurisdiction in the premises" constitutes stipulation and bars litigants from challenging the rules and code unless the original premises are rebutted and debunked.  This Declaration rebuts, denies and debunks the premise we are in original jurisdiction and Of "WASHINGTON'S" premises upon premises upon premises that it and it's code are constitutional and republican in form AND OPENS THIS SOPHISTRY FOR ALL TO SEE.

It is equally true that this presumption [ that “STATE OF WASHINGTON” exists] is not conclusive, and that upon direct attack, the return may be shown to be false. 50 C.J. 581, section 307 DUBOIS v. WESTERN STATES INVEST. CORP., 180 Wash. 259, 263, 268 (Dec. 1934).

A Washington Territory case dealing with the issue above as to the style of enacting laws shows clearly that the "act" in the Session laws of 1889-90, Page 94 was clearly not constitutional; refer to The Seat of Government Case, (1861) [1 Wash. T. 115].

Therefor, the minor proposition (premise) that the above said legislative act on December 13, 1889 (Session Laws 1889-90, Page 94) met the constitutional demand (premise or major proposition) of Article 2, § 18, is rebutted; the conclusion follows that said legislative act is not constitutional and is void from the beginning.

    

The minor proposition (premise) in In the matter of the petition of James Rafferty for a writ of Habeas Corpus" (1890), 1 Wash 382, at 388,  was that the superior court organized by the legislature met the constitutional demands (major proposition) (premise) of Article 4, § 1.

     

The court in In Re Cloherty (1891), 2 Wash. 137, 139,  decided that, under the constitution, the legislature can set up no other like courts,  such as the supreme and superior courts, than are therein provided and that any court so set up must be inferior and receive only certain limited portions of the judicial power.

    

The superior courts organized March 27, 1890 (Session Laws 1889-90, Page 341) were given in § 17 of that act a seal with the words "State of Washington" on it.  These words, "State of Washington,” then fall within the meaning set forth in the above said legislative "act" of December 13, 1889, in which "Territory of Washington" means "State of Washington.”  

YES, STATE OF WASHINGTON REALLY MEANS TERRITORY OF WASHINGTON!!!!

YES, I CAN PROVE THAT ALL THE STATES ARE STILL TERRITORIES UNDER THE LAW!!!!

FOR EXAMPLE, I HAVE CERTIFIED PROOF FROM THE NATIONAL MILITARY ARCHIVES IN WASHINGTON D.C. THAT ABSOLUTELY AND CONCLUSIVELY PROVES THAT SENATE BILL 185 THE ALLEGED ENABLING ACT THAT ALLEGEDLY PURPORTED TO ALLOW WASHINGTON, NORTH DAKOTA, SOUTH DAKOTA, IDAHO AND MONTANA TO CONVENE A SECOND CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, FRAME A NEW AND SECOND CONSTITUTION AND ELECT A SECOND AND NEW STATE GOVERNMENT FOR THE NEW UNION THAT WOULD ALLOW . . . “A WOMAN” . . .  CHRISTINE GREGOIRE TO RUN FOR GOVERNOR IS IN FACT AND LAW A ONE HOUSE BILL!!!!

YES, SENATE BILL 185 THE ENABLING ACT IS A ONE HOUSE BILL!!!!

YES, WOMEN SUCH AS CHRISTINE GREGOIRE HAVE NO RIGHT TO VOTE OR HOLD OFFICE AS THE GOVERNOR OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON EITHER!!!!

YES, SENATE BILL 185 THE ENABLING ACT NEVER PASSED BOTH HOUSES OF CONGRESS EVEN THOUGH THEY SAID IT DID!!!!

The conclusion of the "act" organizing superior courts must be that said courts were given a "Seal" and life pursuant to said "Seal" under an unconstitutional "act" thus rendering such courts as not being constitutional.

    And, Cloherty stated at page 139:

"But to the legislature of the state the constitution delegates authority to transfer from one of the constitutional courts to another certain limited portions of the judicial power; and it may also provide new, inferior courts, not specifically mentioned in the constitution, to which may be assigned such part of the inferior judicial power as it may deem wise to transfer.  The natural conclusion from this premise would be that a court for the administration of municipal ordinances must have been created by an act of the legislature."  In Re Cloherty (1891), 2 Wash. 137,  at page 139

State ex rel. Fugita v. Milroy (1913), 71 Wash. 592,  cited the above portion of Cloherty and farther saying:

"The constitutional provisions quoted make it as plain as human language can express a thought that the legislature may provide for 'inferior courts' and prescribe their 'jurisdiction and powers.'

In commenting ... and etc."  "The only limitation upon the power of the legislature is that courts established by it shall be, in fact and in law, inferior courts."  Fugita, at page 595.  

Thus, Cloherty and Fugita clearly rebut the premise in Rafferty that the legislature could set up other superior courts equal in station with the constitutional superior courts at Article 4, § 6, which constitutional article and section are self-executing per Rafferty at 384-385, and those session laws prima facie appearing to re-enact said section, etc.,  does not vivify the same.  Although the court's conclusion in Rafferty was for Article 4, § 4, the constitutional provisions of Article 4, § 6 deserve like consideration being in the same plane of authority.

All of the issues in contention are subject to the above said foreign law and will determine that the pretend laws of this pretend court are based upon extra vires acts of the legislature.  The pretend complaint (traffic ticket) brought forth by the rolling tax collectors (city police officers, county sheriff’s and the Washington State Patrol) allegedly has its basis in the codes of the Territory of Washington, which codes and Territory are foreign to the state of Washington.

Article XXVII of the constitution for the state of Washington was to allow a peaceful and logical transition from Territory status to the status of a state of the Union of the united States of America on an equal footing with the original 13 Union States.  

There was and is no authority for the legislature to create or pretend to create, via Article XXVII, a parallel fictional form of government in the nature of the Territory of Washington or any other entity.  

Nor is there any authority to create or extend the 1881 territorial “Code of Washington” into the state of Washington,  then to revise it and call it the “Revised Code of Washington” and use the extra territorial code to operate upon the people of the state of Washington.  

The true character of the RCW’s is territorial code operating in a Territorial sense upon the People of the state of Washington “in this State” or “within this State.”

        RCW 82.04.200  "In this state" and  "WITHIN THIS STATE"  "IN THIS STATE" and "WITHIN THIS STATE" includes all federal areas lying within the exterior boundaries of the state.  [1961 c 15 82.04.200.  Prior:  1955 c 389  21;  prior L  1949 c 228 2,  part;  1945 c 249 1,  part;  1943 c 156 2,  part;  1941 c 178 2,  part;  1939 c 225 2,  part; 1937 c 227 2,  part;  1935 c 180 5,  part;  Rem. Supp. 1949 8370-5,  part.] (emphasis added).

NO YOUR HONOR,  I WAS NOT . . . “DRIVING” . . .  “A MOTOR VEHICLE” . . . “IN THIS STATE” . . . OR . . . “WITHIN THIS STATE” . . . OR . . . ANY OTHER FEDERAL AREA WITHIN THIS STATE!!!!

So do you folks out there really believe that the corporate State of Washington lawfully exists????

Do you think your . . . STATE . . .is in fact a lawful . . . State????

Do you really believe that all the attorney, prosecutors and judges are following the laws????

Do you really still believe that Obama needs the permission of Congress to declare or commit an Act of War????

Do you really believe that your vote makes any difference????

See MADISON, Federalist 62 which reads:

It will be of little avail to the people,  that the laws are made by men of their own choice,  if the laws be so voluminous that they cannot be read, or so incoherent that they cannot be understood; if they be repealed or revised before they are promulgated, or undergo such incessant changes that no man, who knows what the law is to-day, can guess what it will be to-morrow.

The Revised Code of Washington is not the law.”  Parosa v. Tacoma, 57 Wn.(2d) 409  (Dec.22, 1960).

THESE PEOPLE ARE PRETENDING TO BE UNDER THE COLOR OF LAW AND COLOR OF TITLE WHICH AT FIRST GLANCE, ONLY MAKES THEM APPEAR TO BE PRIMA LAWFUL FUNCTIONARIES OF GOVERNMENT FOR WE THE PEOPLE.

A claim of necessity has little sway if the constitution has any significance.

    "It must be conceded that there are such rights in every free government beyond the control of the state.  A government which recognized no such rights...is after all but a despotism...”  Loan Association v Topeka, 87 US 655, 663.

See The Seat of Government Case,  which states in part:

        “The staring facts that the constitutions of so many states, made and perfected by the wisdom of their greatest legal lights, contain a statement of an enacting clause, in which the power of the enacting authority is incorporated, is to our minds a strong, and powerful argument of its necessity. It is fortified and strengthened by the further fact that Congress, and the other states, to say nothing of the English Parliament, have, by almost unbroken custom and usage, prefaced all their laws with some set form of words, in which contained the enacting authority. Guided by the authority of such eminent jurists as Blackstone, Kent, and Cushing, and the precedents of national and state legislation, the Court arrives with satisfaction and consciousness of right in declaring, that where an act like the one now under consideration, is wanting in essential formalities and solemnities which have been mentioned, it is inoperative and void, and of no binding force or effect.”  The Seat of Government Case, (1861) [1 Wash. T. 115].

The Supreme Court of the State of Washington held in State ex rel. Lemon v. Langlie, clearly stated that:

         “The function of a state constitution under our form of government is well stated in 11 Am. Jur. 651, Constitutional Law, section 44, as follows:  A written Constitution is not only the direct and basic expression for all departments and offices of government with respect to all matters covered by it and must control as it is written until it be changed by the authority that established it.  No function of government can be discharged in disregard of, or in opposition to the fundamental law. The state Constitution is the mandate of a sovereign people to its servants and representatives. No one of them has a right to ignore or disregard its mandates; and the legislature, the executive officers, and the judiciary cannot act beyond the limitations of such Constitution.” State ex rel Lemon v. Langlie, 45 Wn.2d 82, 273 P.2d 464 (1954).

See also Southcenter Joint Venture v. NDPC,  which states in part:

        “[9] The “public function” doctrine is a means of satisfying the “state action” requirement.  It provides: The state cannot free itself from the limitations of the Constitution in the operation of its governmental functions merely by delegating certain functions to otherwise private individuals.  If private actors assume the role of the state by engaging in these governmental functions then they subject themselves to the same limitations on their freedom of action as would be imposed upon the state itself.”  Southcenter Joint Venture v. NDPC, 113 Wn2d 413, 431,  461 , 780 P.2d 1282 (Oct. 1989).

See also Love v. King County,  which states in part:

        “Under our form of government, ultimate sovereignty, so far as the state is concerned, rests in its people, and so long as the government established by them exists, that sovereignty remains with them except in so far as they have expressly surrendered it to a higher sovereignty.  “All political power is inherent in the people, and governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed, and are established to protect and maintain individual rights.” Const. Art. 1, section 1.”  Love v. King County, 181 Wash. 477 (April 1935).

See also State ex rel. Lemon v. Langlie, supra, which states in part:

        “The entire source of governmental authority is found in the people.  Either directly or through the legislature they create such officers and agencies as they deem desirable for the administration of public function and declare the quantum of power to be exercised by each.  Their will, in these respects, finds its expression in the Constitution and laws. State ex rel. Dragstedt v. State Board of Education, 103 Mont. 336, 62 P.(2d) 330 (1936).  See also EXCHANGE NAT. BANK v. UNITED STATES, 147 Wash.176, 184, 189 (Mar. 1928), and IN RE DICKSON’s ESTATE., 197 Wash. 145, 156, 157 both citing Dollar & Herron which read:  “First, it is said that a familiar rule of construction requires us to hold that, whenever a sovereign is not named in a statute, it is not bound by the act if it tends to restrain or diminish its rights or powers.  Dollar Savings Bank v. United States, 86 U.S. 227, 22 Law Ed. 80; United States v. Herron, 878 U.S. 251, 22 Law Ed. 273.”   State ex rel Lemon v. Langlie, 45 Wn.2d 82, 273 P.2d 464 (1954).

IF A JUDGE DENIES MY MOTION TO STRIKE THE ILLEGAL CASH ONLY BAIL AS VIOLATIVE OF BOTH THE STATE AND FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONS, HOW CAN I CHARGE HIM WITH PERJURY OF HIS OATH OF OFFICE????

    RCW 9A.72.020    Perjury in the first degree.

        (1) A person is guilty of perjury in the first degree if in any official proceeding he makes a materially false statement which he knows to be false under an oath required or authorized by law.

        (2) Knowledge of the materiality of the statement is not an element of this crime, and the actor's mistaken belief that his statement was not material is not a defense to a prosecution under this section.

        (3) Perjury in the first degree is a class B felony.

    [1975 1st ex.s. c 260 § 9A.72.020.]

DID YOU KNOW THAT THE JUDGES ARE NOT SWEARING AND SUBSCRIBING THEIR SIGNATURE UNDER OATH IN OPEN COURT????

DID YOU KNOW THAT JUDGES ARE MERELY SIGNING A DOCUMENT THAT IS NOTARIZED AS ALLEGEDLY BEING SIGNED UNDER THE PENALTY OF PERJURY????

WHAT GOOD IS THAT IF YOU CAN’T CHARGE THEM WITH PERJURY BECAUSE THEY CAN SIMPLY ARGUE THAT THEY DID NOT SWEAR TO THEIR OATH IN OPEN COURT IN ANY OFFICIAL PROCEEDING AS REQUIRED BY RCW 9A.72.020 AND THE PERJURY STATUTES IN EVERY STATE????

DID YOU KNOW THAT ALL THE JUDGES ARE USING UNSWORN DECLARATIONS TO SWEAR TO THEIR OATH????

    “RCW 9A.72.085  Unsworn statements, certification.

        

    

    Whenever, under any law of this state or under any rule, order, or requirement made under the law of this state, any matter in an official proceeding is required or permitted to be supported, evidenced, established, or proved by a person's sworn written statement, declaration, verification, certificate, oath, or affidavit, the matter may with like force and effect be supported, evidenced, established, or proved in the official proceeding by an unsworn written statement, declaration, verification, or certificate, which:

    

         (1) Recites that it is certified or declared by the person to be true under penalty of perjury;

    

         (2) Is subscribed by the person;

    

         (3) States the date and place of its execution; and

    

         (4) States that it is so certified or declared under the laws of the state of Washington.

    

         The certification or declaration may be in substantially the following form:

    

    

         "I certify (or declare) under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of Washington that the foregoing is true and correct":

    . . . . . . . . . . . .     . . . . . . . . . . . .

    (Date and Place)     (Signature)

    

         This section does not apply to writings requiring an acknowledgement, depositions, oaths of office, or oaths required to be taken before a special official other than a notary public.

    

    [1981 c 187 § 3.]

RCW 9A.72.089 clearly states . . . “This section does not apply to writings requiring an acknowledgement, depositions, oaths of office, or oaths required to be taken before a special official other than a notary public.”

SO,  DID YOUR JUDGE REALLY TAKE AND FILE A PROPER OATH????

In the Washington State Supreme Court once again held that the constitution and by-laws of an organization constitute a contract between a member and the organization, and that the terms of such constitution and by-laws are enforceable and are the measure of the relative rights and privileges of the parties.  In the course of the opinion, the court quoted approvingly from a California case which it found appropos to the situation:

        “The law was succinctly stated by the California District Court of Appeals in Harris v. National Union of Marine Cooks and Stewarts, 98 Cal. App.2d 733, 221 P.2d 136, in the following paragraph:  ‘The constitution of the Union constitutes a contract with the members and is the measure of the authority conferred upon the organization to expel or otherwise discipline them. [Citing cases];  Accord: Leo v. Local Union No. 612 of International Union of Operating Engineers, 26 Wn.2d 498, 174 P.2d 523 (1946).”  Allen v. Office Employees Int’l Union, 53 Wn.2d 1, 329, P.2d 205 (1958).

DO YOU REALLY WANT TO LEARN HOW TO BIND THE JUDGES DOWN WITH THE CHAINS OF THE CONSTITUTION????

"The Constitution is not an instrument for the government to restrain the people, it is an instrument for the people to restrain the government."  -- Patrick Henry

"Let no more be said about the confidence of men, but bind them down from mischief with the chains of the Constitution".  -- Thomas Jefferson

HOW CAN ANY OF YOU PATRIOTS DO THIS IF YOU DON’T KNOW THE LAW????

DO YOU KNOW WHAT THE LAW IS????

HOW CAN ANY OF YOU DO THIS IF YOU DON’T HAVE THE LEGAL SKILLS TO WRITE A COMPETENT MOTION TO DISMISS????

THESE PEOPLE OPERATING OUR UNLAWFUL STATE GOVERNMENTS ARE NOT OUR LAWFUL FUNCTIONARIES BECAUSE THEY DON’T OPERATE UNDER ANY LAWFUL COLOR OF TITLE AND THEY DO NOT OPERATE UNDER AN LAWFUL COLOR OF OFFICE.

THEY ONLY SAY THEY DO!

“Ye are of your father the devil, and the lusts of your father ye will do: he hath been a murderer from the beginning, and abode not in the truth, because there is no truth in him.  When he speaketh a lie, then speaketh of he of his own: for he is a liar, and the father thereof.”  John 8:44

THE FACTS OF LEGISLATION AND HISTORY CLEARLY SHOWS THAT THEY DO NOT OPERATE UNDER A LAWFUL FOUNDATION.

THEREFORE THERE IS NO FICTION OF LAW AND NO COLOR OF LAW.

THEREFORE THEY ARE ALL USURPERS!

THEREFORE THE BLACK LETTER LAW SAYS THEY DO NOT EXIST IN FACT OR LAW.

THEY ARE NOT DEJURE!

THEY ARE NOT DEFACTO!

THEY DO NOT EXIST IN FACT OR LAW!

STATE OF WASHINGTON DOES NOT EXIST IN FACT OR LAW!!!!

THE UNITED STATES DOES NOT EXIST IN FACT OR LAW!!!!

“Think not that I am come to destroy the Law, or the Prophets.  I am not come to destroy them, but to fulfill them.”  Mathew 5:17

THEY HAVE CREATED AN ALICE IN WONDERLAND FANTASY WHERE THE LAWS REALLY ARE THE WORDS THAT COME OUT OF THE JUDGES MOUTH!

QUESTION:  SO WHO IS BEHIND THE CURTAIN????

Go to <www.BARNESREVIEW.ORG> and see . . . “REVENGE of the NEANDERTHAL” . . . A SPECIAL THEME ISSUE FROM WILLIS A. CARTO in the MAY/JUNE 2010 issue of THE BARNES REVIEW VOLUME XVI  NUMBER 3.

ANSWER: SEE REVELATIONS 2:9, REVELATIONS 3:9, REVELATIONS 20:4 AND JOHN 8:44!!!!

THE MIXED BREED CANAANITES WHO ARE THE DIRECT BLOODLINE DESCENDANTS OF THE NEANDERTHAL MAN ARE THE SUB-MAN OR HUMANS . . . WHO CALL THEMSELVES THE JEW, BUT WHO ARE NOT THE JEW, BUT WHO LIE AND ARE FROM THE SYNAGOGUE OF SATAN!!!!

“I know thy works and tribulation, and poverty (but thou art rich) and I know the blasphemy of them, which say they are Jews, and are not, but are the Synagogue of Satan.”  Revelations 2:9.

“Behold, I will make them of the Synagogue of Satan,  which call themselves Jews, and are not,  but do lie: behold, I say, I will make them that they shall come and worship before thy feet, and shall know that I have loved thee.”  Revelations 3:9.

“And I saw seats: and they sat upon them, and judgment was given unto them, and I saw the souls of them that were beheaded for the witness of jesus, and for the word of god, and which did not worship the beast, neither his image, neither had taken his mark upon their foreheads or on their hands: and they lived, and reigned with Christ a thousands years.”  Revelations, 20:4.

“I was about to say that I'd hate to live in a country where the law could mean whatever its rulers said it meant, when it occurred to me that I already do. -- Joseph Sobran

“Ye are of your father the devil, and the lusts of your father ye will do: he hath been a murderer from the beginning, and abode not in the truth, because there is no truth in him.  When he speaketh a lie, then speaketh of he of his own: for he is a liar, and the father thereof.”  John 8:44

“The right most valued by all civilized men is the right to be left alone.” -- Justice Louis Brandeis.

TO ALL YOU PATRIOTS,  PATRIOT GROUPS AND TAX HONESTY GROUPS OUT THERE:

Forget what you know about the law!

Forget what you think you know about the law!

Everything you think you know about the law, the opposite is true!

Everything you know about the law is false!

I CAN SHOW YOU HOW TO BEAT THEM WITH THEIR PHONY STATUTES!

I CAN SHOW YOU HOW TO BEAT THEM WITH THEIR COURT RULES!

I CAN SHOW YOU HOW TO BEAT THEM WITH THE COMMON LAW!

I CAN SHOW YOU HOW TO BEAT THEM WITH THEIR PHONY STATUTORY VOLUME 0 CONSTITUTION!

I CAN SHOW YOU HOW TO BEAT THEM WITH THE ORIGINAL CONSTITUTION!

Do you want to . . . WIN YOUR CASES?

Do you want to start . . . WINNING YOUR CASES?

Do you want to see all the other patriots in your State start . . . WINNING MOST ALL THEIR CASES IN YOUR STATE . . . like lloyd smith, Kurt Riggin and Luis Ewing do in Washington State????

DO YOU WANT TO LEARN HOW TO BIND THE JUDGES DOWN WITH THE CHAINS OF THE REAL CONSTITUTIONS????

If the answer to those questions is . . . YES . . . then please send me an e-mail with your phone number and the best time to call you so that we can discuss having you and/or your group flying me out to your State to do the necessary and required research into your State’s Motor Vehicle Codes and State Constitutions at the Archives Division of the Office of the Secretary of State and at the State Supreme Court Law Library in your State Capital.

“That we henceforth be no more children, wavering and carried about with every wind of doctrine,  by the deceit of men, and with crafttiness, whereby they lay in wait to deceive.”  Ephesians, 4:14

“And we know, that the Law is good, if a man use it lawfully.”  Timothy 1:8

        

“Think not that I am come to destroy the Law, or the Prophets.  I am not come to destroy them, but to fulfill them.”  Mathew 5:17

I can teach you how to teach all the patriots to start winning all their cases in your State like lloyd smith, Kurt Riggin and Luis Ewing do!

I hope this was informative and helpful!

Sincerely

Luis Ewing at (253) 226-3741 or (360) 353-4846 or call me on SKYPE at <luisewing>

PS – THE 1599 GENEVA BIBLE at <http://www.americanvision.com> at TIMOTHY Chapter 5, verse 18 says:

“For the Scripture saith, Thou shalt not muzzle the mouth of the ox that treadeth out the corn:  and, the laborer is worthy of his wages.”  Timothy, 5:18.

Those who expect to reap the blessing of liberty must undergo the fatigue of supporting it.”  Thomas Paine

TO THE SHEOPLE WHO JUST WANT TO PAY THE TICKET BECAUSE IT IS THE EASIER WAY OUT AND CHEAPER:

“They that can give up essential liberty to obtain a little temporary safety deserve neither liberty nor safety.”  Benjamin Franklin

“Still, if you will not fight for the right when you can easily win without bloodshed, if you will not fight when your victory will be sure and not so costly, you may come to the moment when you will have to fight with all the odds against you and only a precarious chance for survival. There may be a worse case. You may have to fight when there is no chance of victory, because it is better to perish than to live as slaves.” – Winston Churchill - The Second World War

"All that is necessary for evil to succeed is that good men do nothing." Edmund Burke

“If ye love wealth better than liberty, the tranquility of servitude better than the animating contest of freedom, go home from us in peace. We ask not your counsels or arms. Crouch down and lick the hands which feed you.  May your chains set lightly upon you, and may posterity forget that ye were our countrymen.” - Samuel Adams, speech at the Philadelphia State House on August 1, 1776.

Web sites under construction:

1.) <www.luisewing.com>

2.)   <www.ultimateusers.com> – Where in the near future you will see MARIJUANA PLANTS overgrowing THE WHITE HOUSE!!!!

1 HAVE SEVEN (7) E-MAIL ADDRESS at <rcwcodebuster @ the following 7 internet provider e-mail  addresses:

a.)  comcast.net>

b.)  gmail.com>

c.)  yahoo.com>

d.)  hotmail.com>

e.)  aol.com>

f.)  live.com>

g.)  mail.com>

PLEASE DON’T FORGET TO COPY & PASTE ALL 7 OF MY E-MAIL ADDRESSES INTO YOUR CONTACTS FOLDER IF YOU DON’T WANT MY E-MAILS TO GET ROUTED STRAIGHT TO YOUR SPAM FOLDER BY YOUR INTERNET PROVIDER:

rcwcodebuster@gmail.com, rcwcodebuster@yahoo.com,  rcwcodebuster@hotmail.com, rcwcodebuster@aol.com,  rcwcodebuster@live.com,  rcwcodebuster@mail.com,  rcwcodebuster@comcast.net

AUTHORITY TO PRACTICE LAW . . . “WITHOUT ADMISSION” . . . by the WASHINGTON STATE SUPREME COURT:  RCW  2.48.190,  RCW 38.38.256,  5 U.S.C. 500 (b),  RCW 26.25.010,  RCW 26.21.005 (19)(a),  RCW 26.21A.005 (21)(a),  RCW 26.26.011 (19),  RCW 26.27.021 (16),  RCW 26.27.041,  18 U.S.C. 1154,  18 U.S.C 1161,  18 U.S.C. 2265,  25 U.S.C. 1301,  25 U.S.C. 1903 (4),  25 U.S.C. 1903 (8),  25 U.S.C. 1911 (a)(b)(c),  25 U.S.C. 1901 -1963 (“ICWA”),  25 U.S.C. 3631,  43 U.S.C. 1602,   44 Fed. Reg. 67584 to 67595 (1979),  26 CFR § 305.7871-1 (a),   26 U.S.C. 7701 (a)(40)(A),  RCW 2.48.170,  RCW 2.48.180 (7),  APR 1.1 (a),  GR 24 (b)(8) and Sections 3275 & 3276 of the Territorial Code of 1881.  See also CR 82.5 (a) & RCW 13.34.240.

CAVEAT WITH OPT OUT AND REMOVAL INSTRUCTIONS HERE: This E-Mail is covered by the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. 2510 to 18 U.S.C. 2521;  RCW 9.73.030 (1)(a)(b);  RCW 9A.52.110; RCW 9A.52.120; RCW 9A.52.130 and RCW 9.73.020 and is legally privileged and you do NOT have my “consent” for forward this e-mail to anyone. The information contained in this E-Mail is intended only for use of the individual or entity named above. If the reader of this message is not the intended recipient, or the employee or attorney or agent responsible to deliver it to the Sendee, please destroy the E-Mail after advising by reply that you erroneously received this E-Mail. The receipt by anyone other than the designated recipient does NOT waive the lawyer or “of-counsel client privilege,”  nor will it constitute a waiver of the “work-product doctrine.”  Any information obtained in violation of RCW 9.73.030;  RCW 9A.52.110; RCW 9A.52.120; RCW 9A.52.130 and RCW 9.73.020 is inadmissible in court pursuant to RCW 9.73.050 and further, anyone who forwards this e-mail to anyone else without my express prior “written consent” is liable for civil monetary damages under Washington law pursuant to RCW 9.73.060 and criminal penalties under RCW 9.73.080.  The information contained in this transmission is privileged and confidential and may be hazardous to your preconceptions. FREE DISTRIBUTION: In accordance with Title 17 U.S.C. Section 107, this material is distributed free “only” to those specific recipients listed above who have previously expressed an interest in receiving the information for research and educational purposes and have made a prior request for said information.  If the reader of this message is not the intended addressee, the reader is hereby notified that any consideration, dissemination or duplication of this communication is strictly prohibited.  RCW 9.73.030 (1)(a)(b)(C);  RCW 9.73.050; RCW 9.73.060 and RCW 9.73.080   This message is being sent to you in compliance with the current Federal legislation for commercial e-mail (H.R.417 SECTION101Paragraph (e)(1)(A)) AND Bill s.1618 TITLE III passed by the 105th U.S. Congress. REMOVAL INSTRUCTIONS: This message cannot be considered SPAM as long as it includes: 1) contact information, and 2) a way to be removed from future e-mailings. If this e-mail communication has reached you in error, or should you wish to be permanently removed from the mailing list,  PLEASE SEND ME AN E-MAIL REQUESTING THAT I REMOVE YOU FROM MY E-MAIL LIST AND I WILL REMOVE YOU WITHIN 72 HOURS FROM MY RECEIPT OF YOUR E-MAIL although it may take me 4 to 5 days to catch up to your e-mail because I get so many e-mail request’s for my FREE FLYERS from all over the U.S. or please return to the below listed address asking me to remove you to Luis Ewing,   c/o General Delivery,   (City of) Copalis Crossing,  The State of Washington  [98536] or call and leave a message with your E-Mail address and request to be removed at (253) 226-3741. Thank you!

May 11, 2011

rcwcodebuster@comcast.net